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ABSTRACT.
In quantum zero knowledge, the assumption was made that the verifier is only using unitary oper-
ations. Under this assumption, many nice properties have been shown about quantum zero knowl-
edge, including the fact that Honest-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge (HVQSZK) is
equal to Cheating-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge (QSZK) (see [17, 18]).
In this paper, we study what happens whenwe allow an honest verifier to flip some coins in addition
to using unitary operations. Flipping a coin is a non-unitary operation but doesn’t seem at first to
enhance the cheating possibilities of the verifier since a classical honest verifier can flip coins. In
this setting, we show an unexpected result: any classical Interactive Proof has an Honest-Verifier
Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge proof with coins. Note that in the classical case, honest verifier
SZK is no more powerful than SZK and hence it is not believed to contain even NP. On the other
hand, in the case of cheating verifiers, we show that Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge where the
verifier applies any non-unitary operation is equal to Quantum Zero-Knowledge where the verifier
uses only unitaries.
One can think of our results in two complementary ways. If we would like to use the honest verifier
model as a means to study the general model by taking advantage of their equivalence, then it is
imperative to use the unitary definition without coins, since with the general one this equivalence
is most probably not true. On the other hand, if we would like to use quantum zero knowledge
protocols in a cryptographic scenario where the honest-but-curious model is sufficient, then adding
the unitary constraint severely decreases the power of quantum zero knowledge protocols.
1 Introduction
Zero knowledge protocols propose an elegant way of doing formally secure identification.
In these interactive protocols, a prover P knows a secret s and he wants to convince a veri-
fier V that he knows s without revealing any information about s. The condition ”without
revealing any information” has been formalized in [3, 4] and this security condition has
been defined in the computational (CZK) and the information-theoretic setting (SZK). Zero
knowledge has been extensively studied and found numerous applications in theoretical
computer science and cryptography (see [16] and references therein).
In addition, zero knowledge is defined for the case of honest or cheating verifiers. In
the honest verifier model, we force the protocol to be zero knowledge only against a veri-
fier who follows the protocol but tries to extract as much information as possible from the
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interaction. An honest verifier is equivalent to the ‘Honest-but-Curious’ or ‘Semi-Honest’
adversary in cryptography. This model has been widely studied in cryptography and is
important in certain realistic scenarios (for example online protocols), where the protocols
are used in complex interactions with limited capacity of cheating ([5], ch. 7). Moreover,
in the case of classical zero knowledge it is particularly interesting, due to the fact that it is
equivalent to the general Zero-Knowledge model against cheating verifiers [6].
In 2002, Watrous proposed a quantum equivalent of zero knowledge proofs [17] for the
case of honest verifiers. In this definition, the prover and the verifier are allowed to use
only unitary operations and the zero knowledge property is defined in a seemingly weaker
way than in the classical case. Watrous proved many interesting results for this class, such
as complete problems, closure properties and a few years later, that honest verifier equals
cheating verifier (i.e. HVQSZK = QSZK) [18]. These results provided strong a posteriori
evidence that Watrous’ definition is the right one for quantum Zero Knowledge.
In this paper, we revisit the definition of quantum zero knowledge and examine the
importance of the unitarity constraint. First, we increase the power of the honest verifier
by allowing him to flip classical coins in addition to performing unitary quantum opera-
tions. Note that flipping classical coins is not a unitary operation and that coin flips are also
allowed in the classical case. In this new setting, we also strengthen the definition of simula-
tion in order to still catch the essence of Zero-Knowledge protocols. In particular, the verifier
does not ”forget” or ”erase” these coins, since he remains honest but curious. Even though
this augmentation to the model seems minimal if not trivial, we prove that any classical
interactive proof has a quantum honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof (Section 3)
with coins. Note that in the classical case, honest verifier SZK is no more powerful than
SZK and hence it is not believed to contain even NP. If, on the other hand, we look at
cheating verifiers, we show that the most general cheating strategies for quantum verifiers
are the unitary ones. In Section 4, we transform any general Zero Knowledge protocol into
a unitary protocol that retains completeness, soundness and the zero-knowledge property.
We like to see the consequences of our results from two different points of view. On one
hand, if we want to use the honest verifier model as a means for the study of general zero
knowledge, then the most important property that we would like is the equivalence of the
two models. This way, one only needs to prove that a protocol is zero knowledge against
honest verifiers and immediately conclude that it can also be made zero knowledge against
cheating verifiers. Our results show that in this case, Watrous’ definition with unitaries is
indeed the right one, since we give strong evidence that this equivalence does not hold in
the non-unitary case. Moreoover, we prove that the use of non-unitaries does not change
the power of a cheating verifier.
On the other hand, the Honest-but-Curious model (that corresponds to the honest ver-
ifier) is not only a means for the study of the malicious model (that corresponds to the
cheating verifier) but an important model in itself pertinent to many realistic cryptographic
scenarios. For example, in certain settings, we can assume that the verifier is semi-honest
when he interacts with the prover via a secure interface, eg. an ATM or a secure web in-
terface. In this case, it might suffice to assume that the verifier does not open the ATM by
force or hack the webpage, instead he can only provide well-chosen legal inputs to these
machines and try to extract as much information as possible from the interaction.
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2 Definitions of classical and quantum Statistical Zero Knowl-
edge
An interactive proof system for a problem Π is an interactive protocol between a computa-
tionally unbounded prover P and a probabilistic polynomial-time verifier V that satisfies
the following two properties:
• Completeness: if x is a YES instance of Π (x ∈ ΠY), then V will accept with probability
greater than 2/3 after interacting with P on common input x.
• Soundness: if x is a NO instance of Π (x ∈ ΠN), then for every (even computationally
unbounded) prover strategy P∗, V will accept with probability less than 1/3 after
interacting with P∗ on common input x.
DEFINITION 1. We say that a protocol 〈P,V〉 solves Π if and only if 〈P,V〉 is an interactive
proof system for Π.
In the classical Zero-Knowledge setting, we want the Verifier to learn nothing from
the interaction with the Prover, other than the fact that the input is a Yes instance of the
problem (x ∈ ΠY) when it is the case. The way this is formalized is that for x ∈ ΠY, one can
simulate in probabilistic polynomial-time the Verifier’s view of the protocol view〈P,V〉(x), i.e.
his private coins, the messages he received from the Prover and the messages he sent to the
Prover. Note that the view is a distribution depending on the random coins of the Prover
and the Verifier and contains all the information that the Verifier gains by interacting with
the Prover. Specifically,
DEFINITION 2. A protocol 〈P,V〉 has the zero-knowledge property for Π if there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S and a negligible function µ such that for ∀x ∈ ΠY,
the simulator outputs a distribution S(x) such that |view〈P,V〉(x)− S(x)|1 ≤ µ(|x|).
In our discussion so far, we have considered the casewhere the Verifier honestly follows
the protocol but tries to extract as much information as possible from the interaction with
the Prover. In order to do that, the Honest Verifier would keep a copy of all themessages and
his coins throughout the protocol and would not erase or discard any of this information.
We can now define the class of Honest Verifier Statistical Zero Knowledge (HVSZK):
DEFINITION 3. Π ∈ HVSZK iff there exists an interactive protocol 〈P,V〉 that solves Π and
that has the zero-knowledge property for Π.
2.1 Honest Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge
Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge proofs are a special case of Quantum Interactive Proofs.
They were defined for honest verifiers by Watrous in [17] and have been also studied in
[8, 18, 9]. We can think of a quantum interactive protocol 〈P,V〉(x) for a promise problem
Π as a circuit (V1(x), P1(x), . . . ,Vk(x), Pk(x)) acting on V ⊗M⊗P . V are the Verifier’s pri-
vate qubits, M the message qubits and P the Prover’s private qubits. Vi(x) (resp. Pi(x))
represents the ith action of the Verifier (resp. of the prover) during the protocol and is de-
cribed by a super-operator acting on V ⊗M (resp. onM⊗P). βi corresponds to the state
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in V ⊗M⊗P after the ith action of the protocol. In other words, β0 is the initial state, β2i is
the state after Pi and β2i−1 the one after Vi.
Defining the Zero-Knowledge property in the quantum setting is not straightforward,
even for the Honest Verifier case. We would still like to say that a quantum protocol has the
zero knowledge property if there exists an efficient way to simulate the Verifier’s view of
the protocol. The main difficulty, however, is the definition of the view of the Verifier, since
in the quantum case there is no notion of transcript. Indeed, the Verifier and Prover send the
same qubits back and forth during the protocol and hence an Honest-but-curious Verifier
cannot follow the protocol and simultaneously keep a copy of all the quantum messages
that have been previously sent.
Watrous ([17]) tried to resolve these problems by defining honest verifier quantum zero
knowledge in the following way: the view of the Honest Verifier for every round j is the
Verifier’s part of the state β j, i.e. view〈P,V〉(j) = TrP (β j). We say that the Verifier’s view can
be simulated if there is a negligible function µ such that on any input x and for each step j
we can create in quantum polynomial-time a state σj such that ‖σj − view〈V,P〉(j)‖ ≤ µ(|x|).
We also distinguish the Verifier’s view depending on whether the last action was made
by the Verifier or the Prover. We note ρ0 the input state, ρi the Verifier’s view after Pi and
ξi the Verifier’s view after Vi. Note that for a state σ with ‖σ− ρi‖ ≤ µ(|x|) it is easy to see
that σ′ = Vi+1(σ) is close to ξi+1 = Vi+1(ρi) in the sense that ‖σ′ − ξi+1‖ ≤ µ(|x|). Hence,
we just need to simulate the ρi’s and hence
DEFINITION 4. A protocol 〈P,V〉 has the zero-knowledge property for Π if there is a neg-
ligible function µ such that ∀x ∈ ΠY and ∀j we can create σj with quantum polynomial
computational power such that ‖σj − ρj‖tr ≤ µ(|x|).
Let us look more closely to the ‘round-by-round’ definition of the simulation. First,
the fact that we simulate the verifier’s view at every round and not just at the end of the
protocol ensures that the zero knowledge property is retained even if the Honest Verifier
follows the protocol up to some round and then decides to abort.
Second, in order for this definition to be pertinent in the honest but curious model, we
need to ensure that the verifier will retain all the information that he acquires during the
protocol and not forget any of it. One way to ensure this is by restricting the verifier to use
only unitary operations. The intuition is that since unitary operations are reversible, they
do not allow for ‘forgetting’ any information. This is precisely the way Watrous defined the
class of Honest Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge (HVQSZK):
DEFINITION 5. Π ∈ HVQSZK iff there exists a quantum protocol 〈P,V〉 with V using only
unitaries that solves Π and that has the zero-knowledge property for Π.
The above intuition was later confirmed by the fact that indeed Honest Verifier Quan-
tum Statistical Zero Knowledge with unitaries is equivalent to general cheating verifiers
([18]).
2.2 The coin model for Honest Verifier Quantum Zero-Knowledge
As we said, we would like to investigate the importance of the unitarity constraint in the
power of quantum zero knowledge. For this, we define and study a newmodel for quantum
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zero-knowledge protocols, where we just allow the verifier to flip classical coins in addition
to performing unitary operations. This is equivalent to saying that the verifier starts with a
private random string r∗ or in a quantum language that the verifier starts with some private
qubits initialized to |0〉 − acting as the verifier usual workspace, and additionally some
qubits in the totally mixed state I − acting as the verifier’s initial coins. The verifier uses his
coins (the state I) only as control bits. More formally, if we suppose that the verifier starts
with the state I ⊗ |0〉〈0| in the space A⊗ B, then he can only use the space A by applying
unitaries of the form:
U(|x〉, |y〉) = |x〉 ⊗ |y⊕ f (x)〉 with |x〉 ∈ A and |y〉 ∈ B
Note that this constraint just implies that the verifier doesn’t forget his coins. In particular,
he does not discard these bits by sending them to the prover.
In this case, of course, one needs to be very careful with the definition of the simulation
since now, the Verifier has the extra classical information of the coins. Since the interaction
is quantumwe still have to consider a ‘round-by-round’ simulation. However, in our defini-
tion of the ‘round-by-round’ simulation we need to insist that one must simulate the entire
private random string of the verifier in addition to the quantum view of the Verifier.
Note that apart from these additional initial coins, the verifier is allowed to use only
unitaries like in the original definition of HVQSZK. We can now define HVQSZKC:
DEFINITION 6. Π ∈ HVQSZKC iff, there exists a quantum protocol 〈P,V〉, where the
verifier’s initial state is (|0〉〈0|)⊗n ⊗ In, that solves Π and has the zero-knowledge property
for Π. The verifier uses only unitaries and uses his coins (the state In) only as control bits.
This model is meant to be a very small augmentation of the original model proposed by
Watrous. Note that the verifier is not able to create by himself the totally mixed state using
only unitaries. It is important to notice that the requirement “the prover uses the state In as
control bits” means that these coins are always part of his view of the protocol or in other
words that he never forgets his coins.
2.3 The hidden-bits model for Statistical Zero-Knowledge
The hidden-bits model was first defined for Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge [2], however,
it naturally extends to the interactive case.
DEFINITION 7. We say that the prover has a hidden-bit r with security parameter k iff:
• r is a truly random bit known to the prover.
• The verifier has no information about r.
• The prover can reveal the value of the bit r to the Verifier. If he tries to convince the
Verifier that the value is r then he will be caught with probability (1− 2−k).
DEFINITION 8. Π ∈ HVSZKHB iff there exists a classical protocol 〈P,V〉 that solves Π and
has the zero-knowledge property for Π where the prover starts with a polynomial number
of hidden bits.
We can also define the associated quantum class
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DEFINITION 9. Π ∈ HVQSZKHB iff there exists a quantum protocol 〈P,V〉 that solves
Π and has the zero-knowledge property for Π where the prover starts with a polynomial
number of hidden bits.
Note that the existence of hidden-bits is a very strong assumption. In particular, we
can remark that hidden-bits imply that the prover and verifier can perform bit commitment
with perfect hiding and statistically binding conditions. Bit commitment is a primitive used
in many cryptographic protocols. More formally:
DEFINITION 10. A bit commitment scheme with perfect hiding condition and statistically
binding condition with security parameter k is a scheme with a commit phase and a reveal
phase such that:
• Commit phase: the prover chooses a bit c and commits to it by interacting with the
verifier. At the end of the interaction, the verifier has no information about c (perfectly
hiding).
• Reveal phase: the prover sends a message to the verifier and reveals the commited bit
c. If the prover tries to cheat and reveal c then he will be caught by the verifier with
probability greater than (1− 2−k) (statistically binding).
Note that both classically and quantumly, bit commitment schemes with k ≥ 1 do not
exist unconditionally [11, 12]. However, there is an easy way to do bit commitment which is
perfectly hiding and statistically binding with security parameter k from a hidden bit r with
security parameter k. The prover commits to a bit c by sending c⊕ r and later reveals r. After
the commit phase the verifier has no information about r (and hence c) and during the reveal
phase the prover cannot lie about r (and hence c) without being caught with probability at
least (1− 2−k). Hence, this scheme is a commitment scheme which is perfectly hiding and
statistically binding with security parameter k.
Classically, if we suppose the existence of such a bit commitment scheme, we can create
zero-knowledge protocols for all interactive proofs [1] and since Shamir showed that IP =
PSPACE [15], we have
PSPACE = IP ⊆ HVSZKHB
3 The role of coins in Quantum Statistical Zero-Knowledge
In this section we prove our main result, that HVSZKHB ⊆ HVQSZKC which implies that
PSPACE ⊆ HVQSZKC. We will first present a general method to create hidden-bits out of
shares. We will then show a way to achieve these shares with a quantum honest verifier that
has coins.
3.1 A general method for creating hidden-bits
The method described here is the one used in [14] to create hidden bits from secret help,
which in turn uses ideas from [7] in order to do Oblivious Transfer. For clarity of exposition,
we show how to hide a single bit, but the construction naturally generalizes to n bits by
repeating in parallel.
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PROPOSITION 11. Let three random bits (s0, s1, b) be such that: the prover knows s0 and
s1 and has no information about b; the verifier knows b and the associated bit sb but has no
information about sb. Then we can create a hidden bit r with security parameter k = 1.
PROOF. From these bits, the associated hidden bit will be r = s0 ⊕ s1 and s0, s1 will be
called the shares of r. The way the prover will reveal r is by sending these two shares to the
verifier who checks that they correspond with the one share he has. We now show that r is
a hidden bit with security parameter 1:
• Since s0 and s1 are random and known to the prover, then so is r.
• Since the verifier knows sb but has no information about sb, he has no information
about r.
• If the prover tries to lie about r then he has to flip exaclty one of the two shares. He
will get caught if he flips sb and will not get caught if he flips sb. Since he has no
information about b, he will be caught cheating with probability 1/2.
Note that if we have for each hidden bit r, k independent random couples of shares
(s0k , s
1
k) such that s
0
k ⊕ s1k = r then similarly, we can suppose that r is a hidden-bit with
security parameter k.
3.2 A quantum way of achieving Hidden Bits
From the coins of the verifier, we now show how to create the shares described in the previ-
ous part. As before, we describe the construction of one hidden-bit which easily generalizes
to n bits. We use three qubits of the verifier’s initial totally mixed state (three coins) as
∑b,sb,c∈{0,1} |b, sb, c〉〈b, sb, c|.
As in the previous part, the bit b corresponds to which share the Verifier has and sb
corresponds to the value of that share. The bit c corresponds to the value of the other share
in the Hadamard basis, i.e. we define |c×〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)c|1〉). The verifier performs the
unitary Ub,sb,c that depends on (b, s
b, c) and sends the outcome to the Prover.
U0,sb,c : |0〉|0〉 → |sb〉|c×〉 and U1,sb,c : |0〉|0〉 → |c×〉|sb〉
The prover has two qubits which he measures in the computational basis and the out-
comes of this measurement will correspond to the two shares. One of this measurements
will give sb and the other one will give a random bit s
b
. The hidden bit r is equal to sb ⊕ sb .
LEMMA 12. The above construction results in a hidden bit r with security parameter 1.
PROOF.
• The bit r = sb ⊕ sb is random since the verifier picks sb at random and the outcome
of the measurement of |c×〉 in the computational basis is also random (hence sb is
random). Since the prover knows the two shares he knows r.
• The verifier knows a share sb which is random since b is random. He has no infor-
mation about the share sb since the outcome of the Prover’s measurement of |c×〉 is
independent of the Verifier’s coins. Hence he has no information about r.
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• b is unknown to the prover: to show this, let ρb be the state of the prover conditioned
on the verifier’s coin b
ρ0 =


wp. 1/4 |0,+〉
wp. 1/4 |0,−〉
wp. 1/4 |1,+〉
wp. 1/4 |1,−〉
and ρ1 =


wp. 1/4 |+, 0〉
wp. 1/4 |+, 1〉
wp. 1/4 |−, 0〉
wp. 1/4 |−, 1〉
We can easily see that ρ0 = ρ1 hence the prover has no information about b. Moreover,
since ρ0 = ρ1 = I, the prover’s state is equivalent to a mixture of classical pairs of
shares. Since he has no information about b, the prover cannot cheat for any of those
classical pairs of shares with probability striclty greater than 1/2.
We can easily extend the above construction to a hidden-bit with security parameter k
for any polynomial k (by creating k independent pairs of shares for this hidden-bit) and also
to n hidden-bits with security parameter k by just repeating this process n times.
Note also that the unitary used by the verifier uses his coins only as control bits. There-
fore, we can use this construction to create hidden bits in a way which is consistent with our
enhanced notion of simulation and show that HVSZKHB ⊆ HVQSZKC. Let us prove this
fact formally:
PROPOSITION 13. HVSZKHB ⊆ HVQSZKC
PROOF.
Let Π a problem in HVSZKHB and 〈P,V〉 a classical zero-knowledge protocol with
hidden-bits that solves Π. We create the following quantum protocol 〈P′,V ′〉 where the
verifier starts with the state : (|0〉〈0|)⊗n ⊗ In (acting as his workspace and coins).
• The verifier V ′ views his coins as the coins of the original verifier V and the coins
needed in order to create hidden bits.
• In the beginning of the protocol the verifier uses our construction and creates hidden
bits with security parameter k.
• Then, the prover and verifier both follow the original classical protocol 〈P,V〉. Note
that this is possible since any classical circuit C can be transformed into a quantum
unitary circuit UC such that UC(|x, 0〉) = |x,C(x)〉.
Note that since V ′ uses his coins as the private randomness of V, he can perform the
classical protocol 〈P,V〉 using unitaries.
We now prove that 〈P′,V ′〉 is a Zero-Knowledge protocol that solves Π. Completeness
is straightforward from the completeness of the original protocol and the fact that in our
construction the prover can always reveal the correct hidden bits. Concerning soundness:
1. If the prover reveals all the hidden-bits correctly, the soundness of 〈P′,V ′〉 is the same
as the soundness of 〈P,V〉.
2. If the prover lies on at least one of the hidden-bits he reveals, then the soundness of
〈P′,V ′〉will be smaller than 2−k since the hidden-bits created have security parameter
k.
To show the zero-knowledge property, we use the fact that we can already simulate the
verifier’s view in the protocol 〈P,V〉. This includes the private coins of V, the messages and
in particular, all the hidden-bits ri revealed by the prover.
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In order to simulate the verifier’s view in the new protocol 〈P,V〉 we have to addition-
ally simulate the following:
• all the coins that the verifier V ′ used in order to create hidden bits.
• The k pairs of shares (s0i , s1i )j, j ∈ [k] for every revealed hidden bit ri.
First, the simulator just flips some coins in order to simulate all the random bits the
verifier uses to construct the hidden bits. In particular, for every revealed hidden bit ri, the
simulator has the corresponding bits (bi, s
b
i , ci)j, j ∈ [k]. From these bits and the value of ri
(which we know from the original simulation), we can now create all the couples of shares
(s0i , s
1
i )j. This allows us to simulate the view of the verifier in the protocol 〈P′,V ′〉.
THEOREM 14. PSPACE ⊆ HVQSZKC
PROOF. From Section 2.3 we know that: PSPACE ⊆ HVSZKHB. We now use the fact that
HVSZKHB ⊆ HVQSZKC and conclude.
Onemight think that this surprising result comes from the fact that the round-by-round
simulation is too weak in our setting and that a satisfactory zero-knowledge property is not
achieved. In fact, if we assume that the verifier follows the protocol, then our notion of
simulation is as strong as in the unitary case. The only extra information that the verifier
has in our protocols is the initial random string which we always simulate at every round.
4 Non-unitaries and cheating verifiers
4.1 Definitions
The goal of this section is to describeWatrous’ definition of Quantum Statistical Zero Knowl-
edge (QSZK) for cheating verifiers. Consider a quantum zero-knowledge protocol between
a prover P and a verifier V where the verifier starts with an auxiliary input w. Additionally,
the prover and verifier have as common input the input of the promise problem which is
a classical string. All the operations described hereafter will depend on this input and this
dependence will be omitted.
We will use the following Hilbert spaces for our analysis.
• P the space of the prover.
• M the space where the prover and verifier store the messages they send.
• V the verifier’s workspace initialized to |0〉.
• W the verifier’s space where the auxiliary input is initially stored.
Let 〈P,V〉 = 〈P1,V1, . . . , Pn,Vn〉. Each Pi acts onP ⊗M and eachVi acts onM⊗V ⊗W .
We can tensor these operations with the identity and suppose that they all act on the space:
P ⊗M⊗ V ⊗W. We can therefore see the whole protocol as a big operation O acting on
P ⊗M⊗V ⊗W. More formally:
DEFINITION 15. For any protocol 〈P1,V1, . . . , Pn,Vn〉 where each Vi and Pi acts on P ⊗
M⊗V ⊗W (in fact by tensoring the Vi’s and Pi’s with the identity) we denote by OP,V the
following admissible mapping:
OP,V : L(W) → L(P ⊗M⊗V ⊗W)
: w → Vn(Pn(. . . (V1(P1( |0〉︸︷︷︸
∈P⊗M⊗V
⊗ w︸︷︷︸
∈W
)))))
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where L(X ,Y) is the set of linear operators from X to Y , and L(X ) = L(X ,X ). In
particular, any mixed state in X can be represented as an element of L(X ).
The zero-knowledge property concerns only what the verifier has at the end of the
protocol. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that M is empty since a cheating
verifier can always move the information from M to V at the end of the protocol. Hence,
we will be interested in:
OV : L(W) → L(V ⊗W)
: w → TrP⊗M

Vn(Pn(. . . (V1(P1( |0〉︸︷︷︸
∈P⊗M⊗V
⊗ w︸︷︷︸
∈W
)))))


which for short we will also denote as OV = TrP⊗MOP,V . More generally, for any super-
operator X that outputs inA⊗B, we denote TrAX the super-operator such that (TrAX)(ρ) =
TrA(X(ρ)). We say that OV is the mapping that corresponds to the verifier’s view of the
protocol. We want to be able to simulate this mapping i.e. be able to create in quantum
polynomial time a mapping Σ which will act like OV and this for every auxiliary input w.
We can now define QSZK:
DEFINITION 16. We say that Π ∈ QSZK if there is a protocol 〈P,V〉 = 〈P1,V1, . . . , Pn,Vn〉
such that:
• Completeness: ∀x ∈ ΠY, the verifier accepts with probability greater than 2/3.
• Soundness: ∀x ∈ ΠN , and for all prover’s strategies P∗, the verifier accepts with prob-
ability smaller than 1/3.
• Zero-knowledge: for any cheating verifier V∗ (where OV∗ is the mapping associated
to 〈P,V∗〉), there is a function µ and a mapping Σ : L(W) → L(V ⊗W) that can be
computed in quantum polynomial time such that ∀x ∈ ΠY, we have
||OV∗ − Σ||⋄ ≤ µ(|x|).
where for any super-operator Φ, ||Φ||⋄ = sup{||Φ⊗ IL(Z)||tr, Z is a complex Euclidean
space} (see [10] for more details on this diamond norm).
Note that if Σ uses V∗ only as a black box, then we can change the order of quantifiers
and have a single mapping Σ for all possible V∗.
In the definition of QSZK, the verifier and the prover can use any physically admissible
operation. We will show that in fact, if the zero-knowledge property holds against cheating
verifiers that only use unitaries then it also holds for cheating verifiers that use any physi-
cally admissible operation. In other words, cheating strategies with unitary operations are
the most general ones.
DEFINITION 17. We say that Π ∈ QSZKU if there is a protocol 〈P,V〉 = 〈P1,V1, . . . , Pn,Vn〉
such that:
• Completeness: ∀x ∈ ΠY, the verifier accepts with probability greater than 2/3.
• Soundness: ∀x ∈ ΠN , and for all prover’s strategies P∗, the verifier accepts with prob-
ability smaller than 1/3.
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• Zero-knowledge: for any cheating verifier V∗ that uses unitaries (where OV∗ is the
mapping associated to 〈P,V∗〉), there is a function µ and a mapping Σ : L(W) →
L(V ⊗W) that can be computed in quantum polynomial time such that ∀x ∈ ΠY, we
have
||OV∗ − Σ||⋄ ≤ µ(|x|).
4.2 Unitary cheating verifiers are as powerful as general cheating verifiers
In this section, we show that in the case of cheating verifiers, coin flips − and more gen-
erally any non-unitary operations − do not add anything to the power of quantum Zero-
Knowledge. In other words, we show that
PROPOSITION 18. QSZK = QSZKU
PROOF. We have by definition that QSZK ⊆ QSZKU . We show now the other inclu-
sion. The main idea is to say that each time the verifier uses a non-unitary, he can use a
larger unitary which will act as a purification of this non-unitary which will only give him
more information. More formally, we use the following fact that is a direct corollary of the
purification lemma. (see [13]).
LEMMA 19. Let C a quantum non-unitary circuit acting on a space A. There is a space B of
same dimension as A and a unitary circuit C˜ acting on A⊗B such that TrBC˜ = C.
Now consider a protocol 〈P,V〉 = 〈P1,V1, . . . , Pn,Vn〉 which has the zero-knowledge
property for any unitary cheating verifier V. Consider a cheating verifier V∗, the protocol
〈P,V∗〉 = 〈P1,V∗1 , . . . , Pn,V∗n 〉 and its associated mapping OV∗ from L(W) to L(V ⊗W).
Recall that:
OV∗ = TrP⊗M (Pn ◦V∗n ◦ . . . ◦ P1 ◦V∗1 )
Consider now n additional Hilbert spacesA1 throughAn and admissible mappings V˜∗i such
that
∀i TrAiV˜∗i = V∗i
The spaces Ai are Hilbert spaces that the verifier possesses. Let us look at the protocol
〈P, V˜∗〉 = 〈P1, V˜∗1 , . . . , Pn, V˜∗n 〉 andOV˜∗ the associatedmapping for the verifier. Thismapping
is a mapping from L(W) to L(A1 ⊗ . . .⊗An ⊗ V ⊗W). We know that there is a mapping
Σ computable in quantum polynomial time such that ||OV˜∗ − Σ||⋄ ≤ µ(|x|).
By construction, we know that OV∗ = TrA1⊗...⊗AnOV˜∗ . Consider Σ
′ = TrA1⊗...⊗AnΣ, we
can easily conclude that
||OV∗ − Σ′||⋄ ≤ µ(|x|)
and that Σ′ is quantum polynomial time computable which concludes our proof.
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